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INTRODUCTION
The controversy surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline
(DAPL) has put the peaceful plains of North Dakota in the
national and international spotlight, drawing thousands of
people to the confluence of the Missouri and Cannonball Rivers
outside of Standing Rock Sioux Reservation for prayer and
peaceful protest in defense of the Sioux Tribes’ treaties, lands,
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cultural property, and waters. Spanning over seven months,
including the harsh North Dakota winter, indigenous leaders
and communities from around the world gathered in arguably
the largest gathering of indigenous peoples in the United
States in more than 100 years.
Implicated in this fight are the 1851 and 1868 Treaties
entered into by the United States and the Great Sioux Nation.
The pipeline route, which was chosen without input from the
Tribes, runs directly through the heart of treaty lands secured
to the Great Sioux Nation in the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie,
lands to which the Sioux Tribes continue to have strong
cultural, spiritual, and historical ties.1 Furthermore, the
construction and operation of an oil pipeline directly upstream
from the Tribes’ current reservations not only threatens their
hunting and fishing rights expressly reserved in the 1868
Treaty (which have been affirmed in numerous subsequent acts
of Congress), but also their reserved water rights pursuant to
the Winters Doctrine.2
The Tribe and their attorneys battled for injunctive relief
to halt the pipeline in federal court, but the Treaties were
largely absent in the pleadings and court opinions. However,
the district court’s June 14, 2017, ruling squarely put the
Treaties as the crux of the surviving argument.3 This presents
problems for the court in both their applicability in the face of
Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes and diminished
trust responsibility as well as the appropriate remedy for the
Tribes when and if these treaty rights are violated.
Accordingly, the case provides an opportunity to analyze the
truth and lies surrounding the constitutional place of Indian
treaties in federal courts.
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution states, “all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2017 WL 2573994 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No.
16-1534) [hereinafter Complaint].
2. See Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, Sept. 17, 1851, ch. 250, 11 Stat. 749; see
infra text accompanying note 167 (discussing the Sioux Treaties and subsequent
legislation); see infra note 169 for a more detailed explanation of the Winters
Doctrine.
3. Memorandum Opinion at 41–42, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No.
239 [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion].
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Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”4 Known as the “Supremacy Clause,” this
constitutional provision has serious implications in federal
Indian law. Of particular importance is whether treaties made
with Indian tribes can be considered the “supreme Law of the
Land.”5 The current litigation and historic indigenous uprising
against DAPL, the route of which lies within recognized tribal
treaty boundaries, provides a contemporary example of the
limitations of the Supremacy Clause.6 This Article places the
Standing Rock and other Sioux Tribes’ legal battle to halt
DAPL against the historical background of Indian treaties and
treaty rights. It offers a contemporary example of how federal
courts’ application of Indian treaty rights and the limits of the
Supremacy Clause fail to ensure Indian treaties and treaty
rights are respected as the “supreme law of the land.”
This Article is comprised of seven parts. In Part I, we
provide a brief overview of the foundational relationship
between Indian tribes and the United States as set forth in the
Constitution. Specifically, we describe bilateral, consent-based
treaty-making as the constitutionally mandated process
governing relations with Indian tribes. Part II discusses how
the end of treaty-making and the adoption of the plenary power
doctrine resulted in a policy transition toward unilateral treaty
abrogation and the diminishment of tribal treaty rights. In
Part III, we further explore how tribal claims for treaty
abrogation and land cession have been dealt with by federal
courts, highlighting the inadequacy and unsatisfactory
resolution of these claims. In Part IV, we analyze the Sioux
Treaties in their historical context, in subsequent acts of
Congress that implicated the treaties and the rights they
preserve, and in major claims cases brought against the United
States for land cession and abrogation of the Sioux Treaties.
Parts V and VI look at how the federal courts have addressed
Sioux land claims in the past. Finally, in Part VII, we set the
background of the treaty rights against the Sioux Tribes’ legal
efforts to halt construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline.

4.
5.
6.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Id.
Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12.
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INDIANS IN THE CONSTITUTION

The United States ratified its first Indian Treaty with the
Delaware Nation in 1778.7 The Delaware Treaty sought to
allow for the passage of the United States Army through the
territory of the Delaware Nation.8 In doing so, the language of
the treaty explicitly recognized Indian ownership of the land
and the authority of the Delaware to govern their territory.9 An
integral component of this treaty was “a paradigm for tribal
federal relations that can only be described as one of
international self-determination.”10 Indeed, this first treaty—
along with subsequent treaties, the Constitution, and early
congressional dealings with Indians—evidences a relationship
between tribes and the federal government based on the United
States’ recognition of tribes’ status as politically distinct
sovereign nations existing alongside the United States.11
For example, Article IX in the Articles of Confederation
explicitly addressed the United States’ relationship with Indian
tribes by granting Congress “the sole and exclusive right and
power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with
the Indian tribes, not members of any of the States, provided
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be
not infringed or violated.”12 Trade agreements entered into
under the Articles of Confederation establish that the power
delegated in Article IX “constituted an authority to regulate the
non-Indians who traded with the tribes, not an authority to
regulate the tribes themselves.”13
However, the Framers of the Constitution saw the Articles
of Confederation’s grant of authority in Indian affairs as
deficient.14 Importantly, the nascent constitutional objection to
the Articles’ treatment of Indians was not the lack of power

13.

7.

Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware Nation–U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat.

8. Id.; Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118–19 (2002).
9. Clinton, supra note 8, at 119.
10. Id. at 120.
11. Id.
12. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 (emphasis added).
13. Clinton, supra note 8, at 128.
14. Id.; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234
n.4 (1985) (“Madison cited the National Government’s inability to control trade
with the Indians as one of the key deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and
urged adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause.”).
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imposed over tribes, but the ability of states to interfere in the
foreign affairs of another sovereign.15 To the Framers, Indian
tribes were foreign nations with sovereignty over their lands
and their governance, and any powers the states retained in
dealing with Indian tribes would undermine what the Framers
saw as the federal government’s exclusive right to manage
political affairs with sovereign governments.16
The text of the ratified Constitution made clear that there
would be little change in the status of Indian tribes as political
entities existing outside of the United States government.17
The Constitution recognized tribes as sovereign nations in two
ways. First, as tribes were not present at the Constitutional
Convention and did not ratify the Constitution, and thus owed
no political allegiance to the United States beyond their
existing treaty obligations, Indians were excluded from the
census and political participation by the “Indians not taxed”
clause.18 Second, Indian tribes are expressly included in the
Commerce Clause alongside two other sovereigns—foreign
nations and the states.19
The Indian Commerce Clause employs exactly the same
word choice used in the Foreign Commerce Clause:
“Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”20 By granting the
federal government the exclusive right to regulate dealings
“with” Indians, and not “of” Indians, the Indian Commerce
Clause granted the federal government broad Indian affairs
powers but did not purport to affect the powers or sovereignty
of the Indian tribes.21 This fundamental aspect of the Indian
Commerce Clause, reflected by the widespread use of treaties,
15. Clinton, supra note 8, at 128, 149.
16. Id.; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82
TUL. L. REV. 509, 548–49 (2007); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in
American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 49 (2005).
17. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 49
(2012).
18. Id. at 50–51.
19. Clinton, supra note 8, at 130.
20. Id. at 131. By employing the same language, the Indian commerce power
was meant to have the same meaning and scope as the foreign commerce power—
that is, the regulation of the United States’ political and economic dealings with a
separate sovereign. Id. Accordingly, while tribes were not characterized as states
or foreign nations under the Constitution, they were certainly regarded as
governments whose economic and political dealings with the United States were
significant enough to warrant inclusion in the Constitution alongside two other
sovereigns. Id.
21. Id.
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shows that although the federal government was undoubtedly
concerned about regulating Indians, it simultaneously realized
that the constitutionally proper method for creating such
regulations was through bilateral treaties rather than
unilateral congressional action. Thus, Congress viewed itself as
having no constitutional basis to exercise authority over Indian
tribes without consent through treaty, as evidenced by the
United States maintaining and expanding treaty relationships
with tribes.22
The behavior of Congress for almost a century after
adoption of the United States Constitution further reflects an
understanding of the limited power granted in the Indian
Commerce Clause and the constitutional necessity of treatymaking with Indians.23 During this period, Congress passed no
law directly regulating an Indian nation or its members in any
fashion.24 While the Trade and Intercourse Acts clearly invoked
the Indian Commerce Clause, the statutory restraints
contained in the legislation focused on the regulation of nonIndians conducting business with Indians and did not regulate
tribes or their members. Even the Removal Act of 1830, which
promoted the removal of tribes to west of the Mississippi,
expressly required tribal consent through treaty for any
removal.25
As congressional actions following ratification of the
Constitution conformed to understanding tribal-federal
relations based on bilateral treaty-making, so too did the
decisions of the early United States Supreme Court. In
Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice John Marshall discussed at
length the nature of aboriginal title and described the so-called
Doctrine of Discovery, which provided an Indian “aboriginal
right of occupancy” and exclusive preemptive rights of first
purchase or acquisition in favor of the United States.26 The

22. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 58–59.
23. Clinton, supra note 8, at 135.
24. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1
Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2
Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
25. See Clinton, supra note 8, at 136 n.60 (explaining that the Removal Act of
1830 only applied to “such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange
the lands where they now reside, and remove there”); see generally Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188 (1999) (invalidating a
removal order for lack of tribal consent).
26. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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decision held that conveyances of Indian land to non-Indians
could not be valid without the assent of the government
holding preemptive rights to the land. The Court also noted the
Tribe’s independent power to make and enforce their own laws,
precluding federal law from otherwise binding the Tribe.27
Thus, according to M’Intosh, federal supremacy applied to
citizens entering into agreements with tribes, but did not apply
to Indian tribes as separate “domestic” nations.
The “Cherokee Removal” cases provided the Supreme
Court another opportunity to analyze the constitutionally
defined limits to the federal government’s powers as they
related to dealing with Indian tribes.28 The Court ultimately
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, as the
Constitution only authorized the Court to hear cases brought
by foreign nations. In the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall
undertook to explain the treaty relationship between the
Cherokee and the United States in acknowledging that the
treaties put the tribe under the protection of the United States,
signifying “that the Cherokees were then dependents.”29
But as Robert N. Clinton observed,
In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall employed the
term dependent, not as a statement of political inferiority or
a statement of federal supremacy, but, rather, as an implied
criticism of the political branches of the United States
government which had failed to enforce the treaty
27. Id. at 593. The Court explained that:
Admitting [tribal] power to change their laws or usages, so far as to
allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the common
stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their territory, and is
held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its
efficacy from their will; and, if they choose, to resume it, and make a
different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States cannot
interpose for the protection of the title. The person who purchases lands
from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them,
so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their
protection, and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of
no tribunal which can revise and set aside [their decision].
Id. (emphasis added).
28. Clinton, supra note 8, at 138. In 1828 Georgia passed a series of laws
diminishing the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation by claiming jurisdiction over
Indian lands. Id. After failed attempts to gain redress from the federal
government, the Tribe filed an injunction to prevent Georgia from executing the
laws. Id.
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 40 (1831).
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obligations of protection to the Cherokee Nation. Thus,
dependence for Chief Justice Marshall was not a source of
federal authority over the Cherokee Nation. Rather, it
constituted the description of a relationship created by
treaty in which the federal government owed the Cherokee
certain obligations of protection: it was a source of rights as
promised in the treaties.30

In Worcester v. Georgia, the Court reached the merits of
the laws at issue in Cherokee Nation when two non-Indians
appealed convictions under a Georgia statute that prohibited
their presence on Indian lands without a license.31 The Court
ultimately found the Georgia statute invalid, largely based on
the reasoning that it violated the sovereignty of the Cherokee
Nation as secured in their Treaty.32 In noting that “the settled
doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence—its right to self-government, by
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection,” Chief
Justice Marshall laid the foundation for an understanding of
Indian tribes’ “dependence” without diminishment of their
sovereignty.33 According to Justice Marshall, Congress could
act in relation to Cherokee lands only if confirmed by the
consent of the Cherokee Nation through a treaty.34 Thus, not
only did the state of Georgia have no power to legislate over the
Indians, neither did Congress, as the exclusive federal power
over Indian affairs was limited to regulating the activities of
nonmembers in their dealings with Indian tribes.
During the 1880s, the Supreme Court would continue to
support the view of Indian tribes as sovereigns located within
the boundaries of the United States but not subject to its
governance.35
In Ex parte Crow Dog, an Indian was tried and convicted
in the Territory of Dakota for the murder of another
Indian.36 In his appeal, Crow Dog argued that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence because the crime

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Clinton, supra note 8, at 141.
31 U.S. 515, 537, 561–62 (1832).
Clinton, supra note 8, at 141.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560–61.
Id. at 561.
Clinton, supra note 8, at 143.
109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
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was committed on tribal land, and both the attacker and the
victim were Native American. The Supreme Court referred to
the codified version of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, and
held that it expressly prohibited federal jurisdiction. The Court
granted Crow Dog’s writ of habeas corpus and ordered his
release, declaring that “to uphold the jurisdiction exercised in
this case, would be to reverse in this instance the general policy
of the government towards the Indians.”37
A number of Congressional actions in the late nineteenth
century laid the foundation for the fundamental change to
consent-based treaty-making Indian policy.38 In 1871, Congress
decided to end treaty-making with Indians.39 Previously,
Indian Commissioners and the Executive Branch had primarily
undertaken treaty-making with advice and consent from the
Senate as prescribed by the treaty provision of the
Constitution.40 Many in the House of Representatives, who
were left in the shadows of treaty-making except for their
routine appropriations, wanted a seat at the Indian policy
table. The House ultimately achieved its demands in an
appropriations rider which gave the House power to change
and approve “agreements” with tribes.41
By the end of treaty-making, more than 200 Indian
treaties had been negotiated by the executive branch and
ratified by the Senate.42 Despite Congress’s decision to stop
treating with Indian tribes, treaties between the United States
and tribes remain the cornerstone of the legal relationship
between Indian tribes and the federal government.43 In fact,
the passing of the 1871 statute itself merely evidences the
negative view of tribal sovereignty, which until this point had
necessitated consent-based treaty-making for the regulation of
tribes and their members.44
37. Id. at 572.
38. Clinton, supra note 8, at 164.
39. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (2012)).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41. Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)).
42. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 59 (citing CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 8 (1987)).
43. Id. at 60 (citing Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and
the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 974–79 (1996)).
44. Clinton, supra note 8, at 168. The constitutionality of this Act, which
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“There can be no greater expression of sovereign respect
between the United States and another political entity than
that of a treaty relationship under the Constitution.”45 Thus,
the main constitutional provision that governed the United
States’ relationship with Indian tribes was not the Indian
Commerce Clause, which was used to pass legislation
regulating non-Indian conduct in relation to tribes, but rather
the Supremacy Clause, which gave effect to Indian treaties by
barring state or private interference with the Indian peoples’
land and their sovereign control.
As treaties became the primary instruments for carrying
out federal Indian policy, they also became the main source of
rights for tribes under the Constitution, deriving from their
place as law under the Supremacy Clause.46 The treaties
between the United States and the Indians constitute a critical
recognition and guarantee of tribal rights to land, resources,
and sovereignty over their own affairs and governance.47
II. THE END OF TREATY-MAKING AND THE CREATION OF
PLENARY POWER
After the end of treaty-making in 1871, Congress moved to
reinvent Indian policy by expressly asserting, for the first time,
direct control over Indian tribes’ sovereign right to selfgovernment in the Major Crimes Act.48 Passed in 1885, this Act
gave federal courts jurisdiction over Native Americans for
seven enumerated crimes committed against non-Indians.49
Placed within the broader history of Indian policy, this Act
fundamentally poses a separation of powers issue as it takes powers reserved in
the Constitution for the executive and places it squarely in the Congress, has
never been challenged. Id.
45. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 59 (citing Mike Townsend, Congressional
Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation and Reform, 98 YALE L. J. 793, 797–
98 (1989)).
46. Clinton, supra note 8, at 141.
47. Id.
48. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153); Clinton, supra note 8, at 170.
49. Major Crimes Act § 9 (“That immediately upon and after the date of the
passage of this act, all Indians committing against the person or property of
another Indian or other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny,
within any territory of the United States, and either within or without the Indian
reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of said territory relating to said
crimes.”).
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followed the Indian assimilation ideals that garnered wide
acceptance and support among the public and government in
the 1880s.50 As the Act constituted the first effort to assert
direct legislative power over tribal autonomy, the subsequent
legal challenge in United States v. Kagama would provide the
first case to test the power of Congress to depart from the
treaty-based understandings of the limitations of federal
authority under the Constitution.51
Kagama involved murder and accomplice indictments
against two Indians for the killing of another Indian occurring
on an Indian reservation.52 The United States claimed
jurisdiction under the new Major Crimes Act, and argued the
constitutionality of the Act rested in part on the Indian
Commerce Clause.53 However, Justice Miller, writing for a
unanimous Court, summarily rejected the Indian Commerce
Clause as a source of congressional authority to directly
regulate Indians, holding that the clause did not allow for “a
system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their
reservations.”54
Instead, without a constitutional basis to assert
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands, the Court took it
upon itself to undertake an “extra-constitutional” endeavor to
uphold the Act.55 Noting that Tribes were territorially within
the bounds of the United States, the Court pointed to the
status of Tribes as “wards of the nation . . . dependent on the
United States” for the assertion that the federal government’s
duty to protect the rights of Indians, as secured through
bilateral treaties, additionally granted Congress the unfettered
authority to regulate away the sovereignty of tribes.56
The Court’s decision in Kagama relied on Justice
50. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 803–05 (2006).
51. Clinton, supra note 8, at 171.
52. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court framed the question of the case as
“[w]hether the courts of the United States have jurisdiction or authority to try and
punish an Indian belonging to an Indian tribe for committing the crime of murder
upon another Indian belonging to the same Indian tribe . . . said crime having
been committed upon an Indian reservation.” Id. at 375.
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id.
55. Clinton, supra note 8, at 181.
56. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84 (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for the political rights.”).
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Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation as the justification for
these powers. However, as one commentator has noted, the
“Court’s reading of protection [as a source of power over Indian
tribes] reversed the concept’s earlier meaning. Crafted to
prevent Native alliances and forestall warfare, the principle of
sole federal protection of Indians originally stemmed from
Native power, not weakness.”57 By claiming the “dependency”
of Indian tribes as a justification of the imposition of
congressional power upon them, the Court upended the
relationship arising from a treaty-based federal obligation to
protect sovereignty in Cherokee Nation.58 For the Court in
Kagama, “wardship” of Indian peoples did not link to federal
treaty obligations securing the protection of tribal sovereignty,
but rather became a vehicle to express the assumed racial and
cultural inferiority of tribes.59
Thus, instead of relying on a textual delegation of
authority over Indian tribes, which the Court itself found did
not exist, the Court relied simply on the duties and protections
secured through the treaty-making process. One scholar has
described this as “a tour de force in judicial constitutional
creativity” and a “major departure from the established norms
of constitutional interpretation.”60 While not expressly
providing for the broad plenary power espoused by today’s
Court, the judicial gymnastics that allowed for the
abandonment of stare decisis in Kagama opened the door for
the rise of unilateral congressional divestiture of Indian tribes’
treaty-secured rights and lands.61 In fact, almost all federal
policy decisions relating to Indians could now be justified by
using the Court’s newly constructed plenary power doctrine,
which disposed of the historical consent-based relationship in
favor of direct and unfettered governance of Indians outside of
treaty-making.62
Congress further dispensed with the traditional
understanding of tribal sovereignty and separatism under the
57. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond The Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J.
1012, 1081 (2015).
58. Clinton, supra note 8, at 175.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 172.
61. Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
507, 529 (1987).
62. Clinton, supra note 8, at 182.
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Constitution in the General Allotment Act of 1887.63 The
general purpose of the Act was to push for the assimilation of
tribes through the reduction of the reservation land base by
allotting land in severalty to individual Indians.64 The allotted
lands were held in trust by the federal government for a period
of twenty-five years, during which the Indians were to embrace
agriculture, Christianity, and all the other ideals
accompanying citizenship in the United States.65 At the end of
this period individual Indians would receive the land in a fully
alienable patent in fee, often subject to the civil and criminal
laws of the state.66 However, the trust period was “short-lived,”
ending in 1906 when Congress authorized the early issuance of
patents to individual Indians if they had been determined
“competent” by Indian Agents, who were generally government
officials authorized to interact with Indians on behalf of the
federal government.67
The allotment policies described in the General Allotment
Act and its amendments had a devastating effect on the
communal reservation land base of Indian tribes. As Judith
Royster has explained:
Thousands of Indian owners disposed of their lands by
voluntary or fraudulent sales; many others lost their lands
at sheriffs’ sales for nonpayment of taxes or other liens. By
the end of the allotment era, two-thirds of all the land
allotted—approximately 27 million acres—had passed into
non-Indian ownership.68

While the practical effects of the General Allotment Act were
devastating to tribal lands and cultures, the legal challenge
mounted against the Act would prove equally as damaging.
Just as the Court used the challenge of the Major Crimes Act to
reformulate the basic treaty-based understanding of tribal
federal relations, the first major challenge to the General
63. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 24 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994)).
64. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10
(1995).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 10–11; see also, Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (amending
§ 6 of the General Allotment Act) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2015)).
68. Royster, supra note 64, at 12.
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Allotment Act in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock would provide the
Court with the chance to cement the plenary power doctrine in
its jurisprudence.69 Lone Wolf presented the Court with the
opportunity to critically rethink the constitutional relationship
between Indian tribes and the federal government prescribed
in Kagama.70 Instead, the Court focused on the narrow
question of whether Congress could unilaterally abrogate a
treaty between the federal government and an Indian tribe,
rather than the broader underlying question of what
precipitated the changing legal relationship of the two
sovereigns.71
In Lone Wolf, the Court held that Congress had both the
power to assert criminal jurisdiction over Indians on their own
lands and the broad power to unilaterally abrogate Indian
treaties.72 At issue in the case was Article 12 of the Treaty of
Medicine Lodge Creek between the Kiowas and Comanches
and the United States, which set aside a reservation and
expressly provided that any further land cessions from the
Tribes would not be valid without the approval of at least
three-fourths
of
all
adult
males
occupying
the
reservation.73 However, in 1900, Congress passed an
“agreement,” which provided for further cessions that opened
up a large part of the reservation for occupancy of non-Indian
homesteaders.74
The Tribes argued that the “agreement” was obtained by
fraud and lacked the three-fourths consent required by the
treaty.75 As such, the legislation opening up the reservation for
settlement under the Allotment Act amounted to a unilateral
abrogation of their treaty-guaranteed property rights, which
they argued violated their due process.76 Although it was clear
that Congress had blatantly and unilaterally breached the
69. Frank Pommersheim, Lone Wolf v. Hitchock: A Little Haiku Essay on a
Missed Constitutional Moment, 38 TULSA L. REV. 49, 52 (2002).
70. Id. at 52.
71. Id. at 50.
72. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
73. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche arts. 2, 12, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat.
581. This type of provision was common in many of the removal treaties signed
with tribes and caused problems for the federal government in the efforts to
secure land necessary to support the rapid western settlement. See Clinton, supra
note 8, at 182–83 n.203.
74. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676.
75. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567.
76. Id. at 567–68.
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treaty, the Court rejected the due process argument and
thereby avoided the question of the validity of the
“agreement.”77 Instead, the Court relied on the extraconstitutional “ward” theory employed in Kagama to validate
the congressional divestment of treaty-reserved lands.78 The
Court stated that “Congress [possesses] a paramount power
over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of
guardianship over their interests, and . . . such authority might
be implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty
with the Indians.”79 The Court went on to claim that Congress’s
plenary authority over the Indians was a political one, which
had been wielded by Congress “from the beginning.”80
In a relatively short passage, the Court made a number of
assertions that would prove to haunt the constitutionally
rooted understanding of tribal-federal relations based on
consensual treaty-making. Not only did the Court fail to cite a
textual delegation of this authority from the Constitution, it
erroneously claimed that this unilateral plenary power over
Tribal affairs had been exercised by Congress throughout
history.81 This simply was not true given that the Major
Crimes Act was the first instance of Congress regulating the
affairs of Indian tribes. Moreover, the Court went beyond the
necessary justification in claiming that Congress’s plenary
power over Native American affairs precluded the courts from
exercising judicial review over congressional acts asserting
control over tribes.82
Ultimately, the Lone Wolf decision marked the end of
consent-based, treaty-oriented Indian policy by replacing the
government-to-government relationship set forth in the
Constitution, previously accepted by the Supreme Court and
practiced by Congress, with the judicially created plenary
77. Id. at 557 (indicating that Congress knew it had not obtained the requisite
signatures of three-fourths of the adult males on the reservation).
78. Id. at 565.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 568.
82. Id.
[A]s Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of
this legislation. If injury was occasioned . . . by the use made by Congress
of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress,
and not to the courts.
Id.
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power doctrine.83 Under this doctrine, Congress was now
unbeholden to the multitude of treaties signed with Indian
nations, and free to diminish Indian lands without consent.84
The modern Supreme Court continues to utilize the
plenary power doctrine to justify the regulation and continued
diminishment of tribal sovereignty.85 However, over time, it
has fundamentally changed the justification for such authority
over Indian tribes in an effort to sanitize the doctrine from the
racialized roots embedded in the wardship theory.86 The Court
officially dispensed with its reliance on the colonial “ward”
theory in favor of a source of textual delegation in the
Constitution in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission.87 In footnote seven, the Court found a textual
delegation in the Constitution, stating that “the source of
federal authority over Indian matters . . . derives from federal
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and
for treaty-making.”88 This statement is perplexing, especially
considering that the Court in Kagama expressly rejected the
Indian Commerce Clause as a justification for plenary power.89
The shift away from the colonial-ward paradigm perhaps
also signals the Court’s understanding of a need to base such
authority on a textual delegation.90 As commentators have
noted, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court
doubled down on its footnote in McClanahan when it held that
“the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to
provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
83. Pommersheim, supra note 69; Clinton, supra note 8, at 185 (“[I]t was the
Lone Wolf decision itself that marked the real beginning of consistent unilateral
congressional action in governing Indian tribes.”).
84. Clinton, supra note 8, at 185.
85. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN
AMERICA (2005).
86. Clinton, supra note 8, at 195; see also Ablavsky, supra note 57, at 1082.
87. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
88. Id. at 172 n.7.
89. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886).
While we are not able to see, in either of these clauses of the
Constitution and its amendments, any delegation of power to enact a
code of criminal law for the punishment of the worst class of crimes
known to civilized life when committed by Indians, there is a suggestion
in the manner in which the Indian tribes are introduced into that clause
which may have a bearing on the subject before us.
Id.
90. Clinton, supra note 8, at 196.
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Indian affairs.”91 Additionally, as recently as 2004, the Court
pointed to the Indian Commerce Clause as one source of
Congress’s plenary power.92 Nevertheless, while the modern
Court explicitly cites textual justifications for the plenary
power doctrine, its roots in the colonial and racist beliefs
exemplified in the “ward theory” continue to limit tribal
assertion of rights and lands secured through bilateral treaties
with the United States government.93
The negotiation of bilateral treaties with the United States
had, since the time of discovery, been the primary means by
which Indians had protected their sovereignty and their lands.
The Court’s holdings in Kagama and Lone Wolf turned this
historical method of dealing on its head by recognizing, absent
a textual delegation, broad congressional plenary power over
Indian affairs.94 Thus, Indian tribes were forced to find a new
way to preserve their treaty rights and resources from
“judicially unfettered” congressional power.95 The tribes knew
after Lone Wolf that the courts would not stop the unilateral
abrogation of Indian treaties, but they could hold the
government responsible to compensate them for land takings.96
With the advent of the New Deal policies in the 1930s
came a shift in Indian policy as well. The Roosevelt
administration dispensed with Allotment Era policies of the
nineteenth century in its New Deal for Indian tribes.97
Additionally, a judicial reconsideration of the government’s
dealings with Indians, specifically in the context of land
cessions, was about to unfold.98

91. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
92. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
93. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 85.
94. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 90.
95. See id.; Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the
Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425,
466 (1998).
96. Cross, supra note 95, at 468.
97. GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM:
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934–45, at 1–16 (U
of Neb. Press, 1980); The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); see also G. William Rice, The Indian
Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a
Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO
L. REV. 575, 578–89 (2009).
98. Cross, supra note 95, at 466–67.

494

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

III. TRIBAL CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURTS
This Part documents how the federal courts have dealt
with Tribal claims for treaty abrogation and land cession. It
begins by outlining the early caselaw developed regarding the
compensability of tribal land and treaty claims. It then
discusses the Indian Claims Commission Act while
highlighting the provisions and loopholes which hampered the
effective resolution of many Indian claims based on violation of
their treaties.
Despite the long and well-documented history of abuse and
misdealing, Indian tribal claims against the federal
government occupy a relatively marginalized position in
domestic law.99 But as sovereign nations preexisting the
Constitution with internationally binding treaties ratified by
Congress, tribal governments who wish to bring claims for
violation of treaty rights or land claims against the federal
government are “relegated to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims, and lumped in with the pleas of fired civil
servants, disgruntled taxpayers, and defense contractors.”100
As Nell Jessup Newton has summarized, “The claims stories,
when broken from the dry legal recitation of the facts in the
cases and placed in context, reveal powerfully the inadequacies
of the dominant group’s stories.”101
Historically, there were three statutory methods under
which Indian tribes could seek money damages against the
federal government: special jurisdictional acts,102 the Indian
Claims Commission Act, and the Tucker Act.103 “In each case,

99. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM.
U. L. REV. 753, 755 (1992) (citing Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 686 (1989)).
100. Steven Paul McSloy, Revisiting the “Courts of the Conqueror”: American
Indian Claims Against the United States, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 537, 541 (1994). The
Court of Federal Claims was established by Congress in 1855 for the purpose of
determining private claims against the United States federal government.
Throughout its history, the Court of Federal Claims has gone through many
changes in its form, procedures, and scope of jurisdiction, but maintains its place
as the sole judicial remedy for private citizens seeking monetary redress from the
federal government. Newton, supra note 99, at 755.
101. Newton, supra note 99, at 760.
102. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92 § 9,
12 Stat. 765.
103. For a more detailed discussion on each of these methods of claims, see
Newton, supra note 99, at 768.
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the claims were usually tried in an Article I court, either the
Indian Claims Commission or the trial court of the old Court of
Claims.”104
While the primary purpose for the creation of the Court of
Claims in 1855 was to open the doors to citizen suits against
the government, any hope that Indians had of using the Court
of Claims to seek redress was summarily dashed in 1863 when
Congress amended the 1855 Act to specifically exempt claims
“growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered
into . . . with Indian tribes.”105 With this amendment, Indians
had to petition Congress for special legislation waiving
sovereign immunity and granting jurisdiction to the Court of
Claims to sue for wrongdoing, including land cession and treaty
violations.
One such act was used to initiate the case United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, which would prove to be one of the first times
the Supreme Court would address Indian land claims and
outline the judicial protections against the unilateral taking of
Indian lands.106 The facts in Shoshone were straightforward
and painted a picture ripe for compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. The federal government had settled another tribe
on the Shoshone Reservation without their consent, in conflict
with the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, which provided the land
was “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed occupation of
the Shoshone.”107 Thus, the Shoshone sought to be
104. Id. at 769.
105. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765; see California v. United States,
119 F. Supp. 174, 177–81 (Ct. Cl. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
Further:
Because section 9 of the 1863 Act denied jurisdiction of claims arising
out of Indian treaties, Indians had to continue to petition Congress for
special grants of jurisdiction to gain a forum for their claims against the
government. Thus, before Indian tribes were granted general access to
the Court of Claims for claims based on treaty title, 28 U.S.C. § 1505
(1946), they were limited in their suits by the language of the
congressional jurisdictional acts. These provisions merely removed the
bar of sovereign immunity to suit; the tribes still had to base their claims
on an independent substantive cause of action or legal theory . . . .
Daniel G. Kelly, Jr., Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands They
Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 664 n.84 (1975).
106. An Act Authorizing the Shoshone Tribe of Indians of the Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming to submit claims to the Court of Claims, ch. 302, 44 Stat.
1349 (1927); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
107. Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 113 (quoting Treaty with the Eastern Band
Shoshoni and Bannock, 1868 art. 2, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673).
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compensated for the taking, including the valuable timber and
mineral resources that were exploited on the reservation.108
The Court agreed, and held that the government’s taking
of tribal interest in land made them liable for payment of just
compensation due to the Tribe’s right of use and occupancy
recognized in the Treaty.109 In doing so, the Court limited its
holding in Lone Wolf, insofar as Congress had the power to
pass laws regulating alienation of land through descent, but
that this power, stemming from the federal government’s
guardianship of the “ward” Indian tribes, did nothing to the
Tribe’s ownership of the land.110
After Shoshone, and throughout most of the 1940s and
1950s, the Supreme Court continued to struggle to develop a
clear framework of Indian land claims that could square the
Supremacy Clause against Congress’s absolute plenary power
and the Fifth Amendment permission of takings with just
compensation.111 Instead of developing a modern Indian
takings regime, they largely categorized claims into two
groups: those that had a protected class of “recognized” Indian
title based on federal recognition, often through treaty dealings
or other agreements with the government; and those that held
“unrecognized” Indian title-based claims for compensation
through Indian title on aboriginal use and occupancy.112
The Court would draw a bright-line distinction between
these two categories of claims and take a step towards limiting
compensation for Indian land claims generally in Tee-Hit-Ton
v. United States.113 Tee-Hit-Ton concerned a takings claim by a
small community of Indians for the sale of timber within the
Tongass National Forest in Alaska. The Indians claimed title
based on the aboriginal use of the area, and sued for
compensation of the value of the timber based on the
demonstrated use and government recognition of their title to
the land at issue. The Court, relying on the lack of official
recognition of their use and occupancy of the land, and the
Indians’ failure to move beyond a “hunting and fishing stage of
civilization,” found no recognized title to the land as in

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Cross, supra note 95, at 469.
Id. at 470.
348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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Shoshone, but rather only “claims to rights to use identified
territories.”114 The Court went on to hold that Indian
occupation of land alone, without specific governmental
recognition of said ownership, did not create a right against
taking or extinction by the United States that would be
protected under the Fifth Amendment.115
As one commentator opined, after Tee-Hit-Ton,
Indians were entitled to just compensation for a taking of
their lands only if they could meet two conditions. First,
they had to show that Congress had taken deliberate action
to recognize their permanent use and occupancy rights. . . .
[This was] usually embodied in an authoritative treaty,
statute, or a demonstrated congressional course of
conduct . . . . Second, they had to show that Congress had
not acted in its Lone Wolf garb as Indian guardian when it
took their lands.116

Despite the Court’s discrete distinction limiting Indian land
claims, the decision in Tee-Hit-Ton must be read against the
creation of the Indian Claims Commission, which operated as
Congress’s solution to the Indian land claim problem.117
The plenary power of Congress to abrogate treaties
notwithstanding, the Court’s indecision regarding the
compensability and status of Indian land claims incited concern
among the non-Indian occupants of former Indian lands.118 As
worries mounted, so did the pressures on Congress to enact a
title-clearing mechanism that would finally remove potential
Indian title claims from their lands.119 There was also a
contingent who supported the settling of Indian claims based
on the historical wrongs perpetrated by the federal government
and the contributions of Indians to World War II efforts.120
Congress created the Indian Claims Commission by the
Act of August 13, 1946 to hear claims of “any Indian tribe,
band, or other identifiable group of American Indians against

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 285.
Cross, supra note 95, at 473 (emphasis added).
Id.
Newton, supra note 99, at 771.
Cross, supra note 95, at 473.
Id. at 474.
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the United States.”121 The Act provided for review of decisions
to the Court of Claims, followed by certiorari review to the
Supreme Court. The Act provided broad grounds for recovery,
including claims based on “unconscionable consideration” for
tribal lands which were taken and “claims based on fair and
honorable dealing not recognized by any existing rule of law or
equity.”122 But underneath this seemingly magnanimous intent
was another motive. A major goal of the legislation was to
remove clouds from land titles so as to facilitate the continued
expansion and settlement of the American West.123 Thus, the
Act served to permanently settle Indian tribes’ land claims in
order to “prepare them for the termination of their special
status under United States law.”124
Perhaps this is why the Act, as interpreted by the Court,
created a new cause of action for all Indian claims, not only
those of sound legal nature, but also those “of a purely moral
nature not cognizable in courts of the United Sates under any
existing rules of law or equity.”125 Specifically, the Act created
five broad classes of claims for Indian tribes:
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution,
laws, treaties of the United States, and Executive orders of
the President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, including
those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant
would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United
States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims
which would result if the treaties, contracts, and
agreements between the claimant and the United States
were revised on the ground of fraud, duress . . . ; (4) claims
arising from the taking by the United States . . . of lands
owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for
such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and
(5) claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are

121. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (codified as
amended at §§ 70–70w (1976)), repealed by Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-465,
90 Stat. 1990.
122. Id. § 2.
123. Cross, supra note 95, at 473.
124. Id.
125. Kelly, supra note 105, at 676 (quoting Otoe v. United States, 131 F. Supp.
265, 275 (Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955)).
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not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.126

Specifically, class four has been used to recover against the
United States for outright taking of aboriginal title lands since
the language of that clause covers takings by treaty “or
otherwise” of Indian owned or “occupied” lands.127 Conversely,
when a treaty is at issue, tribes have based claims under clause
three, including arguments that the “treaty was secured by
fraud or duress or that the Government paid an unconscionably
low consideration for the lands ceded.”128 Additionally, clause
five’s considerably broad language addressing “fair and
honorable dealings” has been used as the basis for claims
whether or not a treaty is involved and it has augmented
claims based on clause three or four recovery.129
Despite the various causes of action under the Act, there
were many barriers to successful and just resolution of what
factually seemed to be straightforward property claims. The
primary obstacle for Indian claims was posed by the formation
of the body envisioned in the Act itself. The legislation allowed
for the creation of two distinctly different models to hear and
decide Indian claims—a cooperative model, which hinged on
the creation of an investigative division charged with
investigating facts and submitting findings to the Commission,
and an adversarial model—which modeled the Court of Claims
in many respects, including more formalized procedures and a
focus on monetary reimbursement.130 In the end, the
Commission, composed of commissioners who had no
experience in Indian law, adopted an adversarial model and
eventually transformed the Commission into a claims court.131
In doing so, the court “viewed its remedial arsenal as restricted
to money damages, a view that seems consistent with the
legislative intent.”132 This adversarial court procedure also
meant that tribes would face considerable evidentiary issues
126. Indian Claims Commission Act § 2.
127. Kelly, supra note 105, at 676 (citing United States v. Fort Sill Apache
Tribe, 480 F.2d 819 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); United States
v. Pueblo De Zia, 474 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Plamondon v. United States, 467
F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1972)).
128. Kelly, supra note 105, at 677.
129. Id.
130. Newton, supra note 99, at 772.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 773.
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proving control of the exact land at issue, government coercion,
and unfair dealings in the treaty process.133
Unfortunately for the tribes, proving how unconscionable
the Government’s actions were in the dealings and land grabs
was only the beginning of the problem.134 In addition to
entering the courts to fight an arsenal of highly trained
government attorneys, tribes also “had to walk through a
minefield of liability-limiting rules.”135 Two of those rules
engrained in the Indian Claims Commission Act (which would
play a major role in the Sioux land claims brought before the
federal courts) included the disallowance of interest on claims
and the inclusion of gratuitous offsets.136
One of the major concerns in settling Indian claims was
the huge amount of interest potentially owed to tribes for land
cession claims based on events decades before. In that regard,
the government favorably viewed the limiting of recovery to
the Indian Claims Commission Act and its disallowance of
interest awards.137 Because Congress had not submitted itself
to the liability of interest awards in the Act, the courts used a
strict construction of limiting liability to find the Act did not
allow it. Instead, bound by congressional intent that
reparations be paid for Indian title takings, the courts
undertook to determine just rewards for land cession while
avoiding the huge accrued interest payments due if recovery
was based on traditional Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.138
This made the government liable for interest on an Indian
claim only if and when there was a statute, contract, or
constitutional claim because of the no-interest rule.139
133. For an overview of the evidentiary burdens facing tribes, see generally
Leonard A. Carlson, What Was It Worth? Economic and Historical Aspects of
Determining Awards in Indian Land Claims Cases, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA:
THE INDIANS ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 87 (Imre Sutton & Ralph Leon Beals eds.,
1985).
134. Id. at 88–89.
135. Newton, supra note 99, at 773.
136. Id.; see also Carlson, supra note 133, at 96.
137. Kelly, supra note 105, at 677–78 (citing Fort Berthold Reservation v.
United States, 390 F.2d 686, 690 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
138. Typical takings brought under the Fifth Amendment are eligible for
interest payments. See Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476,
497 (1937); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923).
139. See Nooksack Tribe of Indians v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 712, 718
(1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); see also Loyal Band or Group of Creek
Indians v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 426, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
813 (1951); 28 U.S.C. §2516(a) (1988). See generally Howard M. Friedman,
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In the end, the process of settling Indian claims would
outlast the Indian Claims Commission, which would prove to
be simply an element in the grand scheme.140 During its time,
however, the “bureaucratically oriented” nature of the
Commission bred deep discontent among Indians, climaxing
with its rule of money payments in lieu of land restoration.141
For some, the Commission did not fulfill its purpose of
liquidating Indian rights or even Indian title, rather it
“updated the legal parity” of the land purchases the United
States had made.142 As Vine Deloria Jr. has argued, the
Commission worked “merely to clear out the underbrush and
allow the claims created by the forced political and economic
dependency during the last century to emerge.”143
IV. THE SIOUX TREATIES OF 1851 AND 1868—THEN AND NOW
Beginning in 1804, when the Sioux made first contact with
Lewis and Clark’s expedition, numerous treaties were entered
into between the United States and bands of the Oceti
Šakowin, the “Seven Council Fires” or the Great Sioux
Nation.144 However, despite demarcations of Indian lands in
these treaties, settlers and the burgeoning fur trade led to a
continued push into Sioux territories and culture.145 This
eventually prompted Congress to take action to secure safe
traveling routes between the Missouri River frontier and the
emerging settlements on the West Coast.146 In 1850 Congress
began a concerted effort to establish peace treaties with the
Plains Indians, including the Sioux.147 The 1851 Fort Laramie

Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial Protection of the Fisc, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 26
(1970).
140. Harvey D. Rosenthal, Indian Claims and the American Conscience: A
Brief History of the Indian Claims Commission, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE
INDIANS; ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 35, 63 (Imre Sutton ed., 1985).
141. Id. at 63–64.
142. Id. at 64.
143. VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 227 (1974).
144. EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION
VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 8 (1991).
145. Id. at 10.
146. Id. at 16. As discussed in Part I, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 includes
the “Treaty Clause,” which vests the power in the Executive “by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.”
147. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, Sept. 17, 1851, ch. 250, 11 Stat. 749.
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Treaty (1851 Treaty) purported to do just that. Under the
Treaty, several of the Great Plains Indian tribes, including the
Sioux, established peace with the United States and vowed to
keep peace among the traditionally warring tribes of the
region.148 In return, the United States agreed to protect
Indians from the increasing number of homesteading pioneers
and, perhaps more importantly, agreed to compensate the
Indians through $50,000 payments each year for fifty years.149
The 1851 Treaty also included demarcations of tribal
boundaries in order to keep peace among the Indians.150 The
Sioux’s land under the Treaty stretched to some sixty million
acres, including the Black Hills.151 With boundaries marked by
the Missouri River, the Platte River, and the Heart River, the
Sioux’s land under the Treaty encompassed large swaths across
North and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, and
Nebraska.152 These boundaries were contentious to many Sioux
present at the treaty negotiations as they gave both the Powder
River and Big Horn Country—land which the Sioux had held
since 1822—to the Crow and Kiowa, traditional enemies of the
Sioux.153 The government is said to have placated the Sioux’s
reluctance by clarifying that the boundaries established by the
Treaty were principally to achieve peace and did not represent
forfeitures of land for any tribe party to the Treaty.154
Upon the terms of the deal reaching Congress, however,
the government quickly and unilaterally altered the Treaty by
reducing the annuity payments down from fifty years to ten.155
The government also capitulated in enforcing the terms of the

148. Id.
149. Id. art. 3.
150. Id. art. 5.
151. Id.
152. Id. More specifically:
The territory of the Sioux or Dahcotah Nation, commencing the mouth of
the White Earth River, on the Missouri River; thence in a southwesterly
direction to the forks of the Platte River, thence up the north fork of the
Platte River to a point known as the Red Bute, or where the road leaves
the river; thence along the range of mountains known as the Black Hills,
to the head-waters of Heart River; thence down Heart River to its mouth;
and thence down the Missouri River to the place of beginning.
Id.
153. Id.
154. LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 18.
155. Id.
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Treaty against the swell of the gold rush miners and settlers.156
As Lazarus notes,
[T]he necessity of the undertakings (signing of the treaty)
seemed terribly remote back in Washington, two thousand
miles from the changing western landscape . . . . If the
passing whites slaughtered the buffalo and deprived the
tribesmen of their subsistence, the government would
compensate them at least for the next decade. In the
absence of a more immediate crisis few politicians thought
beyond that.157

The unilateral revision to the Treaty and establishment of
arbitrary boundaries, along with the continued encroachment
from settlers and the resulting destruction of the buffalo,
worked together to ensure that the peace envisioned in the
1851 Treaty would never materialize.158 Skirmishes and
retaliations tested the tensions of all those involved, eventually
festering into outright war.159 From around 1865 to 1868, the
United States and Great Sioux Nation fought in the Powder
River War, which was a series of battles in which the Sioux
Tribes fought to protect the integrity of the Treaty lands
against the incursion of white settlers and the construction of
the Powder River Road.160
Seeking an end to the violence on the plains and signaling
a shift in Federal Indian policy, on July 20, 1867, Congress
authorized the Indian Peace Commission to make peace with
the plains tribes in hopes of establishing discrete reservations
on which all whites would be excluded.161 The United States,
acting under the auspices of the newly established
Commission, sought to establish a second treaty, this time to
end the war with the Sioux and facilitate the settling of the
West.162 The Treaty Commission travelled up the Missouri
River to meet with the leaders of the Great Sioux Nation,

156. See generally United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 376–82 (1980).
157. LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 19–20.
158. Id. at 24–27.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 39–40.
161. An Act to Establish Peace with Certain Hostile Indian Tribes, July 20,
1867, ch. 32, 15 Stat. 17.
162. Id.
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where they negotiated the 1868 Sioux Nation Treaty.163
Because each band of the Sioux Nation signed the Treaty
at different times, the end result was documents that reflected
conflicting narratives.164 For the Sioux, the 1868 Treaty was a
peace made on their terms, as they had seemingly won on
every point.165 The government, on the contrary, saw the
conditions in the Treaty, which would lead to the eventual
settlement of the Sioux within the strict bounds of a permanent
reservation, as necessary steps preceding full assimilation of
the natives.166
In the Treaty of 1868, the Sioux Nation reserved the Great
Sioux Reservation for their “absolute and undisturbed use and
occupancy,” lands encompassing the western half of what is
currently South Dakota.167 Along with these lands the Sioux
also secured hunting and fishing rights in the appurtenant
lands and waters.168 Under the Winters Doctrine, the 1868
Treaty also maintained the Sioux’s rights in waters flowing
through the originally defined boundaries established by the
Treaty. This doctrine spawns from the Supreme Court case
Winters v. United States,169 which held that in creating an
Indian reservation, the United States implicitly reserved water
rights for the Indians in the amount necessary to fulfill the
163. LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 45.
164. Id. at 48.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 51.
167. See generally Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, art. 2, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat.
635.
168. Id. art. 11, 16; United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (holding
that Indian tribes enjoy exclusive hunting and fishing rights within reservation
boundaries and that these rights need not be expressly mentioned in the treaty);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
169. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (1908). For a contemporary explanation of
Winters Rights and the Doctrine, see generally Judith V. Royster, Winters in the
East: Tribal Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174–75 (2000). Royster explains:
The basis of this principle is simple: neither the tribes nor the federal
government would have intended to settle Indian societies on confined
tracts of land—too small to support the largely nomadic hunting way of
life practiced by most tribes—without providing sufficient water to
sustain the communities in their new life. The proposition is so
fundamental that it is implicit in the reservation of the land itself. No
statement of an intent to reserve water is necessary; in fact, an express
disclaimer of water rights would probably be required to defeat the
reservation of water that accompanies the reservation of land.
Id.
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purposes for which the reservation was created.170 These
reserved rights exist as of the date the reservation was created
and need not be expressly reserved in the language of the
Treaty.171
Another important provision of the 1868 Treaty was
included in Article XVI. Under this Article, certain lands to the
northwest of the reservation boundaries were designated as
“unceded Indian territory.”172 These were lands that had not
been settled by whites, and as such, no white persons were
allowed to settle or occupy any portion of the territory without
consent of the Indians.173 This included the Powder River
Country west of the Great Sioux Reservation, the same
territory that certain bands of Sioux had issue with being given
back to the Crow in the 1851 Treaty.174
The government’s rationale behind designating this land
was to appease a certain contingent of the Sioux who were
more hostile to the idea of confinement posed by a permanent
reservation.175 In doing so, “Indians who wished to live by the
chase rather than by government dole might continue to reside
in this tract. That neatly postponed a dispute over going to the
reservation, but government officials confidently looked to the
day when the extinction of the buffalo would eliminate the
issue.”176
For some, the choice to accept the Treaty and move onto
the reservation came not from a desire to abandon their
traditional lifestyle, but rather out of pure necessity.177 With
the buffalo long since gone from their traditional lands to the
south and a well-rationed United States army patrolling the
countryside, the Brule, for example, had no choice but to make

170. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
171. Id.
172. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, supra note 167, art. 16.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. H. EX. DOC. NO. 97-2, at 19 (1868) (“If the hostile Sioux cannot be induced
to remove from the Powder River, a hunting privilege may be extended to them
for a time . . . . To prevent war, if insisted on by the Sioux, the western boundary
might be extended . . . for the present.”); see also Alexandra New Holy, The Heart
of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties, and Lakota Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 317, 322 (1998) (citing ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE LANCE AND THE SHIELD:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SITTING BULL 115 (1993)).
176. UTLEY, supra note 175, at 82.
177. LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 53.
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their way to the reservation.178 According to one historian,
[d]uring these years, the hunting bands followed the buffalo
in the unceded territory, [while] the agency culture took root
and bloomed. The two factions drifted even farther apart,
separated not only by distance but also by thought, habit,
relationship to the government, and above all by patterns
born of dependence and independence.179

From the outset, the United States and the non-treaty
bands ranging in the North failed to honor the Treaty.180
Congress failed to appropriate the funds needed to fulfill the
promised rations and annuities provisions of the Treaty.181 The
Sioux who were living near the agencies on the reservation
“suffered without the blankets, clothes, knives, kettles, and
other goods they had been promised, and they suffered from
their new diet—too short on meat, too long on flour (which they
did not know how to use), and altogether lacking in quality.”182
What the Sioux could not have known at the time was
that, although the signing of the 1868 Treaty would be the last
true voluntary cession of land, over the next several decades
their territory would be withered away by congressional
acts.183 In 1874, at the behest of frontiersmen who had
advocated throughout the 1860s to open up the Black Hills for
mining, lumbering, and settlement, the United States Army
undertook an exploratory expedition into the Black Hills.184
Led by Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer, the
expeditions sought to establish a military outpost from which
to control the northern bands of Sioux who had not accepted
the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty, as well as investigate
claims of gold in the Black Hills.185 In a month the Army was
in the Black Hills, and by August they had confirmed the
presence of gold. The discovery of gold was widely reported and
the expeditions’ descriptions of mineral and timber resources
were met with an increased cry from the Dakota Territory to
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 54–55.
UTLEY, supra note 175.
LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 53.
Id. at 54.
Holy, supra note 175, at 325.
LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 72–73.
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Washington, D.C., demanding the opening of the Hills for
settlement.186 The only obstacle, of course, were the Sioux and
their 1868 Treaty.187
Beginning in earnest in 1875, the United States went to
great lengths to strike a deal for purchasing the Black Hills
from the Sioux Nation.188 Though the efforts began with a
diplomatic invitation for a Sioux delegation to visit Washington
and meet with President Grant, it eventually evolved into the
“sell-or-starve” tactics employed by Congress, which cut off food
rations to the reservation agencies until the Sioux Nation
agreed to sell the Black Hills.189 By 1877, the United States
had had enough. On February 28, 1877, with the coerced
signatures of roughly ten percent of the adult male Sioux, well
short of the three-fourths required by the 1868 Treaty,
Congress passed a statute which took large portions of the
Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills.190 Under
the statute, all of the lands outside the newly established
reservation boundary, which did not include the Black Hills,
were ceded to the United States along with lands in the 1868
Treaty’s Article XVI unceded Indian Territory.191
In 1889, Congress enacted another statute that would
further diminish the Sioux’s 1868 Treaty lands.192 This Act
dissolved the Great Sioux Reservation once and for all,
splintering the Tribe’s land base into several distinct and
smaller reservations, including the current reservations of the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes.193 The 1889
Act set forth to preserve all the provisions of the previous
treaties with the Sioux that were “not in conflict with” the new
statute.194 The Act also set the eastern boundaries of the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Reservations as the “center
of the main channel” of the Missouri River.195
186. Id. at 75.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 77–79.
189. Id. at 90–91.
190. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254 [hereinafter Act of 1877]; U.S. v.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 388 (“[A] more ripe and rank case of dishonorable
dealings will never, in all probability, be found in our history . . . .”) (citation
omitted). See generally, LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 91–95.
191. Act of 1877.
192. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 [hereinafter Act of 1889].
193. Id.
194. Id. at 896.
195. Id. at 889.
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In 1944, Congress again took aim at diminishing Sioux
land holdings when it enacted the Flood Control Act.196 The Act
authorized the construction of various dams along the Missouri
River, and specifically authorized attendant takings of Sioux
land. Seven subsequent statutes further authorized the taking
of Indian lands for the dam projects.197
Two of these statutes provided for the acquisition of land
from the Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Sioux Tribes for
the newly created Oahe Reservoir.198 Collectively these tribes
lost over 160,000 acres of the fertile lands along the Missouri
River, which supported the tribes’ subsistence, forcing the
relocation of families, buildings, and burial sites.199 The
legislation
contained
important
provisions,
however,
guaranteeing the tribes’ hunting, fishing, and grazing rights on
the taken land as well as access to the Oahe Reservoir.200
Overall, the Pick-Sloan Act has been the direct cause of
more damage to Indian land and resources than any other
public works legislation, with the Oahe Dam specifically
destroying more Indian land than any other infrastructure
project in American history.201 “The payments authorized”
under the various acts were often belated and “based on hasty
appraisals,”
with
“[c]ongressionally-directed
mitigation
measures, such as the reconstruction of hospitals and
government offices as well as the relocation of cemeteries,”
never materializing.202 Congress did not revisit the question of
compensation to the tribes until a generation later.203

196. Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified in scattered
sections of 16, 33, 43 U.S.C).
197. Id.; see also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 813
(8th Cir. 1983); Cross, supra note 95.
198. Standing Rock Oahe Act, Pub. L. No. 85-915, 72 Stat. 1762 (1958)
[hereinafter Standing Rock Oahe Act]; Cheyenne River Oahe Act, Pub. L. No. 81776, 68 Stat. 1191 (1954) [hereinafter Cheyenne River Oahe Act].
199. Peter Capossela, Impacts of the Army Corps of Engineers’ Pick-Sloan
Program on the Indian Tribes of the Missouri River Basin, 30 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 143, 165–66 (2015).
200. Standing Rock Oahe Act at 1764; Cheyenne River Oahe Act at 1193;
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993).
201. MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK SLOAN PLAN AND THE
MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX, 1944–1980, at 134. (1982).
202. Capossela, supra note 199, at 168. The co-author’s father, Kenneth
Fredericks, was relocated as part of the Pick-Sloan project along with his family.
203. See generally id. at 169–79 (discussing the subsequent compensatory
legislation for the Tribes on the Missouri River).
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Unfortunately,
the process by which the Missouri River Tribes obtained
additional compensation for the taking of their valuable
riparian land was as piecemeal and problematic as the
legislative process for the original taking acts during the
termination era of the 1950s. Consequently, some tribes
have continued to petition the Congress for land restoration
or additional compensation.204

As recently as 2007, “the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
conducted a hearing on unresolved Tribal claims under PickSloan” in which testimony presented by the General
Accounting Office “established ranges of recommended
compensation for each of the Missouri River Tribes,” including
a suggestion that “the Standing Rock Sioux, may be entitled to
additional compensation.”205
Altogether, there have been over seventy lawsuits filed in
state and federal courts, and courts of special jurisdiction that
have construed and analyzed the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868
and its various provisions.206 While the claims in these cases
have ranged from determining the government’s obligations to
furnish supplies to jurisdiction over hunting and fishing
regulations, the cases generally illustrate the limited
availability of tribal remedies for abrogation of their treaties,
resulting in losses of lands and attendant devastation to their
way of life.207 Two of the most relevant and well-known legal
cases brought under the Sioux Treaties are Sioux Tribe of
Indians v. United States and United States v. Sioux Nation.
V.

SIOUX TRIBE OF INDIANS V. UNITED STATES

In 1950, shortly after the establishment of the Indian
Claims Commission presented the first method of legal redress
for treaty violations, the Sioux Nation filed a claim for various
204. Id. at 179.
205. Id. (citing Impact of the Flood Control Act of 1944 on the Indian Tribes
Along the Missouri River: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th
Cong. 11–12 (2007) (statement of Robin Nazarro, Director Natural Res. Div., Gov’t
Accountability Office)).
206. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fort
Laramie Treaty of 1868, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 59 A.L.R Fed. 2d 243 (2011).
207. Id.
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land cessions under the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie and the
Act of February 28, 1877 (the 1877 Act).208 The Commission
separated the claims under the 1868 Treaty from those under
the 1877 Act, giving rise to two separate lines of cases. As a
result of persistent land dispossession and federal policies
aimed at assimilation, the Great Sioux Nation had effectively
dissolved in the 1890s, causing the eight present-day Sioux
Tribes to bring the lawsuits in a representative capacity.209
The Commission determined that the Sioux Nation had
aboriginal title to the land obtained by the United States under
the 1868 Treaty.210 It also found that the value of the land at
the time of cession in 1869 was $45,685,000.211 The
Commission disallowed all offsets requested by the government
and, after making certain adjustments, awarded the Indians
$43,949,700.212
The government appealed, and the Court of Claims
reversed the Commission’s denial of offsets, holding that the
1868 Treaty was not a treaty of peace as the Commission had
held, but was rather a treaty of cession.213 Due to this
distinction, the payments and services the government
supplied to the Sioux could be considered as compensation for
the ceded land. The government was thus entitled to produce
evidence accounting for the payments and services under the
treaty as “payments . . . on the claim.”214
Prior to the Court of Claims remand regarding the
allowance of offsets, in October 1979 the government had made
an offer to the Sioux Tribe’s attorneys to settle the offset issue
for $4,200,000, resulting in an award of $39,749,700.215 The
attorneys for the Sioux Tribes accepted the offer subject to
conditions, which the government rejected.216

208. See Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151, 152–
53 (1974).
209. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 862 F.2d 275, 277 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
210. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 419, 424–25
(1970), aff’d, 500 F.2d 458, 470–72 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
211. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 38 Ind. Cl. Comm. 469, 532 (1976).
212. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 42 Ind. Cl. Comm. 214, 257 (1978).
213. United States v. Sioux Tribe, 616 F.2d 485, 487 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 488.
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In 1983, the government again offered to settle the offset
issue for $4,200,000, but the eight member-tribes . . .
refused to consider the settlement. The Claims Court, the
successor to the Trial Division of the Court of Claims, then
ordered the Sioux Tribe’s counsel formally to present the
settlement offer to the tribes, and further directed the
tribes, through their governing bodies, to consider and act
upon the offer.217

Two of the tribes accepted the settlement, four of the tribes
explicitly denied the settlement in favor of seeking return of
the lands ceded under the 1868 Treaty, and two of the tribes
implicitly rejected it by failing to respond to the settlement.218
Ultimately, in 1985, the Claims Court concluded that the
litigation had become “an uncontrolled quagmire” and that
the simple fact that four of the reservation tribes are
refusing to accept any settlement or award of this Court,
which does not include the return of their land, is indicative
of the plaintiff’s [sic] refusal to comprehend, after thirty-five
years of litigation, that this Court can only award money
judgments.219

Thus, the court terminated the litigation and awarded the
Sioux Tribes $39,749,700 as fair and equitable compensation
for its claims of land cession under the 1868 Treaty.220 The
Federal Court of Appeals held that the Claims Court had
improperly imposed upon the parties a settlement to which
they had not consented, and accordingly vacated the award and
remanded the case to the Claims Court for further proceedings
to resolve the claim.221
“On July 29, 1987, seven months later, the parties filed . . .
a Stipulation of Facts ‘regarding the offsets of the government
in this case’ and a joint motion ‘to enter judgment in
accordance with the Stipulation of Facts.’”222 In part, the

217. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046, 1048–49
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
218. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 84, 86–90 (1985).
219. Id. at 85.
220. Id. at 90–92.
221. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 806 F.2d at 1050–52.
222. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 862 F.2d 275, 278 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
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Motion for Judgment stated: “The parties move the Court to
approve the Stipulation of Facts and to enter judgment in
accordance with the Stipulation of Facts in the amount of
$40,245,807.02 which represents the gross award of
$43,949,700 less stipulated offsets of $3,703,892.98.”223 The
Claims Court agreed and issued judgment for the Sioux Tribe,
authorizing a recovery from the United States of
$40,245,807.02.224
Two months later the Oglala and Rosebud Sioux Tribes
filed a motion seeking relief from the judgment, arguing that
the attorney of record had no authority to enter a motion which
formed the basis for the final judgment and that the
“substantial legal, moral and political interests of the Tribes
would be harmed if not vacated.”225 In acknowledging
Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs and the Court’s
limited available remedies, the Claims Court declined to vacate
its judgment on the ground that “[i]t is not for this Court to say
whether the Congress of the United States will ever decide to
return some or all of the Sioux land.”226
In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, the court of
appeals ended thirty-eight years of litigation by affirming the
Court of Claims award for land ceded by the 1868 Treaty. 227 In
doing so, the court agreed that the Sioux Nation had aboriginal
title to approximately fourteen million acres of land east of the
Missouri River which were ceded to the United States by the
1868 Treaty.228 However, the court of appeals also held that the
Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the two
Sioux Tribes’ motion for relief from the judgment and that
counsel for the Sioux Tribes “had authority to enter the
stipulation of facts that resulted in the final judgment.”229
Finally, the court of appeals found that the tribes’ request to
vacate the judgment, and award them compensation for the
treaty violations, and to allow them to seek dismissal and
thereby deny them the benefits of the award, was untimely and
thus could not be allowed.230
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 94, 100, 105 (1987).
Id. at 105.
862 F.2d 275, 276–77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See id.
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 281.
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VI. UNITED STATES V. SIOUX NATION
The Sioux’s claim for the taking of the Black Hills would
take a somewhat more complicated path. After Congress
passed the Act, the Sioux made consistent claims that they
regarded the 1877 Act as a breach of the 1868 Treaty.231
However, Congress failed to enact a mechanism under which
the Sioux could litigate their claims against the United States
until 1920, when a special jurisdictional act was passed after
years of lobbying by the Sioux.232 The Sioux brought suit under
this Act in the Court of Claims, “alleging that the Government
had taken the Black Hills without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”233 The Court of Claims
dismissed the case in 1942, holding the 1920 Act did not
authorize adjudication of whether the compensation afforded
the Sioux in the 1877 Act was adequate, and that the Sioux’s
claim was a “moral” one not protected by the Fifth
Amendment’s just compensation clause.234
Upon enactment of the Indian Claims Commission Act in
1946, the Sioux resubmitted their claim to the Indian Claims
Commission along with their claim for land ceded under the
1868 Treaty.235 After bifurcating the claims, the Commission
held that the 1942 Court of Claims decision did not bar the
Sioux’s taking claim and in fact, the Sioux were entitled to just
compensation because the 1877 Act constituted a taking.236 On
appeal, the Court of Claims affirmed the Commission’s holding
and ultimately found the Sioux were entitled to an award of at
least $17.5 million, without interest, for the lands surrendered

231. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 383–84 (1980) (“The Sioux
thus affected have not gotten over the talking about that treaty yet, and during
the last few years have maintained an organization called the Black Hills Treaty
Association, which holds meetings each year at the various agencies for the
purposes of studying the treaty with the intention of presenting a claim against
the government . . . for territory ceded under it.”) (quoting FRANK FISKE, THE
TAMING OF THE SIOUX 132 (1917)).
232. Act of June 3, 1920, 66 Cong. ch. 22, 41 Stat. 738 (Sioux Jurisdictional Act
authorizing the Sioux Nation to bring suit for the alleged Fifth Amendment
taking of the Black Hills).
233. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 384.
234. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 681–84, 689 (1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 789, 63 S. Ct. 992 (1943).
235. See Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151, 152–
153 (1974).
236. United States v. Sioux Nation, 518 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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under the 1877 Act and for resources taken by trespassing
settlers prior to passage of the Act.237 However, the court also
held that the merits of the takings claim had been reached in
its 1942 case brought under the 1920 jurisdictional statute and
that, whether resolved “rightly or wrongly,” the present claim
was thus barred by res judicata.238 The court also noted that
only if the acquisition of the Black Hills amounted to an
unconstitutional taking would the Sioux be entitled to
interest.239
On March 13, 1978, Congress passed an act providing
for de novo review by the Court of Claims of whether the 1877
Act effected a taking of the Black Hills, without regard to res
judicata, and authorizing the consideration of new evidence.240
In its review, the Court of Claims applied the Fort Berthold
test241 to distinguish between a taking for which interest is
owed and a mere breach of trust for which no interest is
owed.242 Upon consideration, the court affirmed the
Commission’s holding the 1877 Act as a taking in exercise of
Congress’s power of eminent domain over Indian property.243
Accordingly, the court held that the Sioux were entitled to an
award of interest at an annual rate of five percent dating from
1877 on a principal compensation sum of $17 million.244
The government unsurprisingly filed for appeal before the
Supreme Court in 1979, asking the Court to review the
constitutional question of whether ceded Indian lands are
compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment.245 The Court
granted certiorari in what would become perhaps the most
important Indian takings case decided by the Court.246

237. Id.
238. Id. at 1306.
239. See id.
240. Act of Mar. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153.
241. Under the Fort Berthold test, a good faith, but incompetent, effort to pay
the tribe insulates the government from Fifth Amendment liability. This test
directs the court to assess whether Congress was acting as a trustee by merely
transmuting the tribe’s land into money or as a sovereign confiscating tribal land.
See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390
F. 2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
242. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1159, 1162 (Ct.
Cl. 1979).
243. Id. at 1170.
244. Id. at 1183–84 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
245. See United States v. Sioux Nations, 444 U.S. 989 (1979).
246. Clinton, supra note 8, at 201–02.
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In United States v. Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Indian Claims Commission’s holding that the
government’s 1877 acquisition of the Black Hills constituted an
unjust taking under the Fifth Amendment.247 In concluding
such a violation had taken place, the Supreme Court similarly
invoked the Fort Berthold test to determine whether the
government made a good faith effort to provide full value to the
Tribe.248 As discussed by the Court, the Fort Berthold test had
been designed to reconcile two lines of cases that were
seemingly in conflict with one another.249
The first line of cases centered wholly on Lone Wolf’s
invocation of plenary power and Congress’s “paramount power
over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of
guardianship over their interests, and that such authority
might be implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a
treaty with the Indians.”250 The second line followed the
Court’s decision in Shoshone, which conceded Congress’s
paramount power over Indian property, but held that “[t]he
power does not extend so far as to enable the Government to
give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its
own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to
render, just compensation.”251
In distinguishing the case from Lone Wolf, the Court held
the 1877 Act did not alter the investment of Indian tribal
property, but constituted a taking of tribally owned property
which had been given to the Sioux for their exclusive
occupation.252 Because the Act constituted a taking, it required
the government to pay just compensation to the Sioux
Nation.253
247. 448 U.S. 371, 423–24 (1980).
248. Id. at 416–21.
249. Id. at 408.
250. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
251. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937)
(citing United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1935)) (internal
quotations omitted).
252. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423–24 (1980).
253. Id. at 423 (internal citations omitted). The Court explained:
In every case where a taking of treaty-protected property is alleged, a
reviewing court must recognize that tribal lands are subject to Congress’
power to control and manage the tribe’s affairs. But the court must also
be cognizant that “this power to control and manage [is] not absolute.
While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and
advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitations inhering in . . . a
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These cases and the Court’s reasoning demonstrate that
“when it finally became possible” to legally address the
expropriation of the treaty lands under the 1868 Treaty and
1877 Act, “the only legally cognizable claim, in light of
[Congress’s plenary power as espoused in] Lone Wolf, was a
[Fifth Amendment] takings claim, the remedy for which was a
cash payment . . . rather than” specific performance of the
treaty and “return of [the treaty-protected] lands.”254 After
almost a half-century of litigation, the land cessions imposed on
the Sioux Nation had resulted in a “squabble over money,”
regardless of the assurance of the Supremacy Clause that their
treaties constituted the “law of the land.”255
Enforcement of the takings clause in Sioux Nation left the
federal government in possession of the Black Hills, a result of
the limited remedial regime for Indian taking claims under
United States law.256 After United States v. Sioux Nation,
Indians can finally get just compensation for federal takings of
the treaty-reserved lands or resources if they can show an
unjust result and Congress’s bad intent, but otherwise are
limited in securing the return of lands and resources once
expropriated.257 As the Court of Claims stated in Sioux Indian
Tribe v. United States, “[i]t is not for this Court to say whether
the Congress of the United States will ever decide to return
some or all of the Sioux land.”258
To truly understand what is at stake for the Tribes and
their members, the fight against DAPL must be viewed against
this intricate and checkered historical context. For the Sioux
Tribes engaged in this historic battle, the present is
inextricably linked with the past, and despite the voluminous
litigation and claims settlement, the 1851 and 1868 Treaties
survive as the truest representation of their status as
independent sovereign nations.

guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.”
Id. at 415 (citing Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 109–10).
254. Clinton, supra note 8, at 202–03.
255. Id. at 202.
256. Id.
257. 448 U.S. 371.
258. 14 Cl. Ct. 94, 105 (1987).
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VII. THE FIGHT AGAINST THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE
Today, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is waging a historic
battle against DAPL, a 1,168-mile-long oil and gas pipeline
that will carry 570,000 barrels of crude oil daily from the
Bakken region of North Dakota across four states to refineries
in southern Illinois.259 The pipeline intersects the 1851 Treaty
reservation and traditional territories of the Tribes, lands to
which the Tribes continue to have strong cultural, spiritual,
and historical ties.260
The abrogation and unilateral “settlement” of the treaty by
the convoluted Indian claims regime and the Supreme Court in
United States v. Sioux Nation has limited the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe’s legal remedies against the United States for
activities taking place on its treaty lands and impacting its
treaty resources. Because of the fact that the pipeline path lies
within the boundaries of the 1851 Treaty and on lands that
contain Standing Rock’s vital cultural, spiritual, and physical
resources, the case shows the utter failure of the Supremacy
Clause to ensure the original treaty be respected as the
“supreme Law of the Land.”
In June 2014, Dakota Access, the entity charged with
building the pipeline, notified the Army Corps of Engineers
(Army Corps) of its intent to construct DAPL underneath Lake
Oahe.261 In October of the same year, Dakota Access sought to
obtain multiple authorizations needed to begin construction,
including verifications that it complied with Nationwide Permit
12 under the Clean Water Act, permission under the Rivers
and Harbors Act, and an easement under the Mineral and
Leasing Act.262 In December 2015, the Army Corps published
and sought comment on a Draft Environmental Assessment
(EA) that evaluated the environmental effects of DAPL’s
proposed crossing at Lake Oahe.263
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe submitted comments to the
Draft EA that highlighted a number of concerns about the
259. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB (D.D.C. July 27, 2016).
260. Id.
261. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Memorandum Opinion at 7,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB
(D.D.C. June 14, 2017) [hereinafter Partial Summary Judgment Opinion].
262. Id.
263. Id. at 8.
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Draft EA’s inadequacy. In particular, the Tribe was concerned
that it failed to consider the potential harm to the Tribe’s
rights resulting from the construction and operation of the
pipeline, to acknowledge the proximity to the Standing Rock
Reservation, and to consider environmental justice concerns.264
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe submitted comments on the
Draft EA expressing similar concerns.265
The Tribes were not the only entities that expressed
concern with the Draft EA. The Department of the Interior
(DOI), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation all submitted
comments to the Army Corps. Their comments highlighted the
lack of analysis on DAPL’s impact on treaty and trust
resources, specifically the impact on water resources.266
Nonetheless, on July 25, 2016, the Army Corps published a
Final EA and Mitigated Finding of No Significant Impact.267
Under this Final EA, the Corps provided Dakota Access with
verifications of compliance with Nationwide Permit 12 and
granted permission under the Rivers and Harbor Act necessary
for construction under Lake Oahe, while assuming the Corps
did not grant an easement under the Mineral Leasing Act.268
Two days later, on July 27, 2016, Standing Rock filed suit
against the Army Corps seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.269 In its complaint, the Tribe claimed the Corps
violated multiple federal statutes in its approval of the
construction and operation of DAPL. Specifically, the Tribe
brought claims for relief under the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA), National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), Clean Water Act, and Rivers and Harbors Act.270 On
August 10, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe successfully

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 8–10; see also Letter from Reid J. Nelson, Dir., Office of Federal
Agency Programs Advisory Council on Historic Pres., to Colonel John W.
Henderson (Mar. 15, 2016); Letter from Philip Strobel, Dir. of Nat’l Envtl. Prot.
Act Compliance & Review Program, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Brent Cossette (Mar.
11, 2016); Letter from Lawrence Roberts, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian
Affairs, Dep’t of Interior, to Brent Cossette (Mar. 29, 2016).
267. Partial Summary Judgment Opinion, supra note 261, at 10.
268. Id. at 11.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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intervened as a plaintiff and subsequently filed its own
complaint which plead claims under the same four statutes.271
On August 4, 2016, Standing Rock filed a motion for
preliminary injunction based solely on violations of the
NHPA.272 Specifically, the motion focused on violations of
Section 106 of the Act, which requires consultations with Tribal
governments where a project has the potential to impact sites
of cultural and historic relevance to the Tribe.273 In its motion,
the Tribe cited a survey prepared by a Dakota Access
consultant which identified dozens of historical and
archaeological sites in the pipeline’s path, many of which had
been deemed “unevaluated.”274
On September 2, Standing Rock submitted to the court the
recent discovery of stone features and graves that were
immediately adjacent to the pipeline’s right-of-way,
approximately two-to-four miles away from the Lake Oahe
crossing.275 The very next day, Dakota Access moved
construction equipment to the previously undisturbed tract of
land identified by the Tribe in the September 2, 2016 filing,
and began to grate over the exact parcels of land identified in
the filing as having archeological and burial remains.276 In
response, on September 4, 2016, Standing Rock and Cheyenne
River filed motions for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in
response to the deliberate destruction of historic and religious
sites in the pipeline’s path.277 The TRO intended to halt

271. See Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s First Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB),
ECF No. 37 [hereinafter Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s First Amended Complaint].
272. Motion For Preliminary Injunction Request For Expedited Hearing at 12,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4
(D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 5.
273. Id.; 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2) (2017); 54 U.S.C. § 3027076 (2014) (properties
“of traditional religious and cultural importance to” a tribe may be included on the
National Register, and federal agencies “shall consult with any Indian Tribe . . .
that attaches religious or cultural significance” to such properties).
274. Motion For Preliminary Injunction Request For Expedited Hearing, supra
note 272, at 36.
275. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Declaration, Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016)
(1:16-cv-1534-JEB), ECF No. 29.
276. Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 4, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 30.
277. Id.
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construction in areas east of State Highway 1806 where the
demolition took place, and within twenty miles on either side of
Lake Oahe.278
After hearing oral arguments on September 6, 2016, the
court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the
Tribe’s motion.279 The court ordered that no construction
activity on DAPL may take place between Highway 1806 and
twenty miles to the east of Lake Oahe. Construction activity to
the west of Highway 1806 was allowed to continue.280
On September 8, 2016, Cheyenne River filed an amended
complaint which alleged the Corps’ authorizations of DAPL
violated the United States’ trust relationship with the Tribe as
well as the Tribe’s treaty and statutorily protected property
right in the water of the Missouri River.281 Specifically, the
Tribe argued that their reserved water right equaled a vested
property right which is held in trust by the United States.282
The Tribe went on to argue that by issuing authorizations
without “engaging in a government-to-government consultation
with tribes on actions that could impair tribal trust resources,”
and “without a full EIS to address concerns about the safety of
the Tribe’s water” breached the Corps’ trust responsibility to
the Tribe.283 The court denied Cheyenne River’s amended
complaint, instead urging Cheyenne River to work with
Standing Rock on a consolidated amended complaint.284
Just one day later, on September 9, 2016, the court issued
an Order denying Standing Rock’s motion for preliminary
injunction.285 In its order, the court summarized the Tribe’s
arguments against the permitting of the pipeline, focusing four
arguments on the NHPA and Section 106 determinations. The
court also noted that “Standing Rock Sioux do not claim that a
potential future rupture in the pipeline could damage their
reserved land or water. Instead, they point to . . . the likelihood

278. Id.
279. Minute Order, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 33.
280. Id.
281. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 271.
282. Id. at 54.
283. Id. at 54–55.
284. Minute Order, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 44.
285. Memorandum Opinion, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 39.
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that DAPL’s ongoing construction activities . . . might damage
sites of great cultural or historical significance.”286 The court
focused on the fact that the majority of sacred sites identified
by the Tribe were located on private land, outside of the
jurisdiction of the Army Corps.287 Thus, the court found that
the Tribe could not demonstrate how an injunction against the
Army Corps could prevent the harm to cultural sites from
construction on private land.288
The court also found problematic the Tribe’s definition of
its ancestral lands as “wherever the buffalo roamed,”289 stating
“there is at least some evidence in the record that [ancestral
lands] do not traverse the entirety of DAPL.”290 According to
the Order, this broad and ubiquitous definition of ancestral
lands would lead the court to have to guess as to whether an
interest of the Tribe would be affected at certain points of the
pipeline, an exercise it refused to undertake.291 Without
identifying the specific location and resources that would be
affected by construction (the sites destroyed on September 3
notwithstanding, as “for those sites, the die is cast”),292 the
Court found that Standing Rock had failed to carry their
burden in identifying a likely irreparable injury and denied the
preliminary injunction.293
Within moments of the court’s denial of the Tribe’s motion,
the Department of Justice, DOI, and the Department of the
Army issued a joint statement announcing suspension of all
additional permitting relating to the pipeline’s crossing at Lake
Oahe due to “important issues raised by the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe and other tribal nations.”294 The statement also
286. Id. at 50.
287. Id. at 51.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 53.
290. Id. (citing to a letter from the Tribe’s current Tribal Historic Preservation
Officer claiming “[m]ost of the DAPL pipeline route crosses Lakota/Dakota
aboriginal land”) (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 54 (“The Court, again, cannot guess that at some undefined
locations there might be harm to the Tribe.”).
292. Id. at 55.
293. Id. at 54–56.
294. Press Release No. 16-1034, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs,
Joint Statement from the Department of Justice, the Department of the Army and
the Department of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jointstatement-department-justice-department-army-and-department-interiorregarding-standing [https://perma.cc/BQ8J-PWMF].
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provided that construction on federal lands bordering Lake
Oahe would be halted while officially calling on Dakota Access
to suspend all construction within twenty miles of the
crossing.295
The next day the Tribes filed an appeal of the district
court’s order to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. On September 12, 2016, Standing Rock filed a
motion seeking an emergency injunction pending appeal of the
district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction.296 On
October 9, 2016, the court of appeals issued an order denying
the Tribe’s motion and dissolving the administrative injunction
that was holding off construction of the pipeline within twenty
miles of the river.297 The court cited a necessary easement that
the government had yet to issue in finding the Tribe had not
“met the narrow and stringent standard governing this
extraordinary form of relief.”298
On October 19, 2016, the district court granted Cheyenne
River’s request for reconsideration and filed the Tribe’s
amended complaint.299 Cheyenne River’s complaint placed
consideration of the impact of the Treaties of Fort Laramie and
the trust responsibility of the United States to the Tribes
squarely before the court. It is important to note, however, that
while the Tribe’s amended complaint sought relief under
breach of the Federal Trust responsibility, the Tribe did not
claim relief under either the 1851 or 1868 Treaties.
After the United States halted construction, Standing Rock
sent multiple letters to the Army Corps expressing concerns
regarding the Final EA’s lack of consideration of a potential
spill’s impact on hunting, fishing, and other treaty rights.300
With these and other submitted materials in hand, on
November 14, 2016, the Army and DOI issued a joint
statement which found that after a review of the available
information, further analysis was warranted before granting

295. Id.
296. Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe v. US Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-05259 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 12, 2016).
297. Order, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. US Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1605259 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 9, 2016).
298. Id.
299. Order, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F.
Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 48.
300. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 12.
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an easement for the pipeline crossing.301
Standing Rock then engaged in discussions with the Corps
concerning the mitigating conditions and easement for the
crossing that would reduce risk and “otherwise enhance the
protection of Lake Oahe, the Tribe’s water supplies, and its
treaty rights.”302 During these discussions, Standing Rock
provided further comments on DAPL’s potential harm to their
water, hunting, fishing, and gathering rights.303 It was during
this additional review phase that the Army Corps also sought
the opinion of the DOI in determining whether the Tribe’s
treaty rights “weigh[ed] in favor or against” granting the final
easement necessary to construct DAPL underneath Lake
Oahe.304
The treaty claims continued to lurk in the background of
the case, and on December 4, 2016, the Solicitor for DOI issued
a memorandum extensively analyzing the Tribes’ treaty rights
implicated by the construction and operation of DAPL.305 In
her memorandum, the Solicitor comprehensively discussed
both the 1851 and 1868 Treaties, as well as the litany of
legislation abrogating these rights.306 In addition to finding
that Standing Rock and Cheyenne River retain their
preexisting on-reservation hunting and fishing rights in the
lands used to create Lake Oahe, the Solicitor’s memorandum
also pointed to the Tribes’ reserved water rights under the
Winters Doctrine as requiring consideration.307 Ultimately, the
Solicitor concluded that because of the treaty rights at issue,
the Army Corps had “ample legal justification to decline to
issue the proposed Lake Oahe easement on the current
record.”308 She further determined that the Army Corps would
be “equally justified in suspending or revoking the existing
Section 408 [Rivers and Harbors Act] permit.”309 The Solicitor

301. Id. at 12.
302. Id. at 13 (citing Letter from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Nov. 14, 2016).
303. Id. at 14.
304. Id. (citing Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor of the U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, M-37038 (Dec. 4, 2016)).
305. Tompkins, supra note 304.
306. Id. at 9–12.
307. Id. at 15 (noting that although the Tribes’ federal reserved water rights
have not been specifically adjudicated or settled that they still remain as the
paramount water rights on the Missouri River).
308. Id. at 5.
309. Id. at 4.
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went on to urge the Corps to delay a decision on the easement
pending consultations with the Tribes and a full
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which “adequately
evaluates the existence of and potential impacts to tribal rights
and interests.”310
The same day, the Army Corps issued its own
memorandum that announced it would deny the final permit
needed to construct the pipeline underneath Lake Oahe,
pending a full EIS.311 The Army Corps memorandum went on
to acknowledge the checkered history of the United States’
dealings with the Great Sioux Nation in inviting the Tribe to
engage in discussions surrounding the pipeline’s path and
safety.312
The results of the 2016 election rendered consideration of
DAPL’s impact on the Tribes’ treaty rights short-lived. On
January 24, 2017, four days after assuming office, President
Trump issued a presidential memorandum that called on the
Army Corps to “review and approve in an expedited manner . . .
requests for approvals to construct and operate the DAPL.”313
On February 3, 2017, the Army Corps abruptly ended the
ongoing EIS and comment period, and found the Final EA
satisfied the requirements under federal law.314
On February 9, the Tribes responded, with Cheyenne River
filing motions for a preliminary injunction and TRO.315
Cheyenne River also filed their second amended complaint.316
The amended complaint sought relief under the Religious

310. Id.
311. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Dep’t of the Army, Statement
Regarding the Dakota Access Pipeline (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/
pressreleases/statement-regarding-dakota-access-pipeline
[https://perma.cc/6W6E-6GQT].
312. Id.
313. Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Dakota Access
Pipeline, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum
(Jan. 24, 2017).
314. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 16.
315. Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp.
3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 98; see also Intervenor-Plaintiff
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4
(D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 99.
316. Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Motion to Amend
Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp.
3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 97.
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Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment in
addition to citing both the 1851 and 1868 treaties as they
conferred an obligation on the Army Corps to manage the
waters of the Missouri River and Lake Oahe.317 The motions
focused solely on the RFRA claims. The next day, Standing
Rock joined Cheyenne River’s motion for preliminary
injunction and filed their own amended complaint, this time
including claims under the RFRA, the Mineral Leasing Act,
and the Administrative Procedure Act.318
After the hearing on February 13, 2016, the Court denied
Cheyenne River’s TRO request and required that Dakota
Access provide an update on every Monday thereafter as to the
likely date that oil would begin to flow beneath Lake Oahe.319
The next day, on February 14, 2017, Standing Rock filed a
motion for partial summary judgment alleging that the Army
Corps authorizations, including the easement, violated its
duties under NEPA by failing to consider DAPL’s effects on
tribal treaty rights and environmental-justice considerations;
that its February decision to grant the easement was arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act; and, that the Army Corps had violated the Clean Water
Act by finding the pipeline satisfied Nationwide Permit 12.320
Standing Rock’s motion asserted that its treaty rights
should be considered, specifically arguing that the EA’s failure
to consider the effects of DAPL on the Tribe’s treaty rights was
improper. The Tribe also asserted that its treaty rights should
be considered as part of NEPA, which requires the Army Corps
to assess the range of risks posed by DAPL to the “full range of
Tribe’s Treaty rights, in the context of the Army Corps’

317. Id.
318. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s First Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 106.
319. Minute Order, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB). On March 16, the court
ordered the cases brought by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (16-1534), the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Oglala Sioux Tribe (17-267) and the Yankton
Sioux Tribe (16-17-267) be consolidated. Filed on September 8, 2016, the Yankton
Sioux Tribe’s complaint was similar to those filed by the Standing Rock and
Cheyenne River Tribes.
320. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of Its Expedited
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB),
ECF No. 117.
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heightened trust responsibility.”321 The Tribe specifically
highlighted the potential impact to water, hunting, and fishing
rights reserved to them in the treaties.322 Cheyenne River
joined Standing Rock’s motion and filed its own motion for
partial summary judgment.323
On June 14, 2017, the court issued an opinion on the
Tribes’ motions for summary judgment.324 Despite holding that
the Army Corps substantially complied with its statutory
responsibilities in the permit process, importantly, the court
held that the Final EA adopted by the Army Corps “did not
adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights
[and] hunting rights.”325
Although the court did not hold that the EA’s analysis of
spill impacts on water satisfied NEPA, the EA mentioned
Standing Rock’s reserved water rights in passing, but
completely omitted Cheyenne River’s water rights.326 Instead,
the EA discussed a potential spill’s impact on water resources
of Lake Oahe only generally, noting that “Standing Rock Sioux
have an intake structure within the river downstream of the
Lake Oahe project area.”327 Thus, despite extensive evidence in
the record, the EA displayed a complete lack of analysis of the
impact specifically on the Tribes’ reserved water rights.328 The
court also found that the EA “adequately discusses the impacts
of [an oil spill] on water—but not on hunting or aquatic—
resources.”329
The treaty claims ultimately were persuasive to the court,
as it found that acknowledgement of, or attention to, the
impact of an oil spill on the Tribe’s fishing and hunting rights

321. Id. at 24.
322. Id.
323. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 18.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
326. Plaintiff-Intervenor Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Join Plaintiff
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 34,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4
(D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 131.
327. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 41.
328. Plaintiff-Intervenor Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Join Plaintiff
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note
326, at 34.
329. Id.
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would be required for the assessment to be adequate.330
Pointing to the “cursory nod” given to the potential effects of an
oil spill on these resources, the court found that the Army
Corps must go beyond acknowledging the potential risks in the
EA by taking steps to identify the risks an oil spill would pose
to wild and aquatic life, which are resources implicating the
Tribe’s treaty rights.331
The court’s emphasis on “inadequate consideration” points
to the limited nature of relief available for the Tribes under
United States law. Specifically, NEPA requires the government
to consider impacts on the Tribes’ treaty rights, but as
construed by the court, it does not require the government to
take any actions to avoid or minimize DAPL’s impacts on the
Tribes’ rights and resources.332 In fact, the court stated that it
could not demand the Army Corps undertake a full analysis of
the Tribes’ treaty rights, instead requiring only that the Army
Corps undertake to “consider” impacts: “The Tribe contends
that the Army Corps had to address Treaty rights qua Treaty
Rights, whereas the Army Corps asserts that it needed only to
consider the effects on the resources implicated by the Treaty
rights—i.e. water, fish and game.”333 The court went on to side
with the Army Corps, finding that “it is sufficient that the
agency adequately analyze impacts on the resource covered by
a given treaty.”334
The court also stated:
Standing Rock may be right that the construction and
operation of DAPL under Lake Oahe could affect its
members in the broad and existential ways it details, but it
offers no case, law, statutory provisions, regulations, or
other authority to support its position that NEPA requires
such a sweeping analysis.335

Finally, despite acknowledging the inadequacy of the EA, the
court failed to order the pipeline operators to stop operations,
citing the “serious consequences” that would transpire if the

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 42.
See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 37–38.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
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pipeline were forced to stop.336 Thus, despite acknowledging
the inadequacy of the EA’s consideration of the Tribes’ treaty
rights, the court implicitly valued the profits of a corporation
over the terms of a treaty that was signed between sovereign
nations and declared the law of the land by the Supremacy
Clause.
The court’s analysis denies consideration of the rights
conferred in the 1851 and 1868 Treaties as the ultimate
authority requiring the government to accordingly tailor its
actions that may threaten and implicate treaty rights. The
court’s analysis here directly contravenes the constitutional
promise that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.”337
Under United States law, the only historic remedies for the
taking of a Tribe’s ancestral land and resources, whether
provided under statute or the Constitution, has been monetary
compensation. But as Standing Rock and the Sioux Tribes’
battle against DAPL has made very clear, these colonial-based
legal mechanisms have left unresolved many fundamental
issues relating to Indian tribes—including their rights to
ancestral land and the enforcement of surviving treaty rights
in the context of unilateral land cessions. As former United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples James Anaya has stated, “What is now needed is a
resolve to take action to address the pending, deep-seated
concerns of indigenous peoples, but within current notions of
justice and the human rights of indigenous peoples.”338
The fundamental concepts of justice and human rights for
indigenous peoples that former Special Rapporteur Anaya
refers to can be fairly summarized in the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The
Declaration embodies the norms and standards by which actors
can protect the rights of indigenous people, primarily through
employing the practice of Free Prior and Informed Consent.339

Id. at 66–67.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
JAMES ANAYA, A/HRC/21/47/ADD.1, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE SITUATION OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ¶ 78 (2012).
339. See generally Carla F. Fredericks, Operationalizing FPIC, 80 ALB. L. REV.
429 (2017).
336.
337.
338.
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But within the broader context of increased international
attention to the rights of indigenous people, a particular focus
has largely been placed on the protection of indigenous peoples’
rights over traditional lands and natural resources.340
Moreover, the international standards and norms that have
developed in relation to indigenous peoples and rights to land
and resources often go beyond the existing international and
domestic treaty obligations.341 As former Special Rapporteur
Anaya and co-author Rob Williams explain:
Domestic legal developments are not necessarily sufficient
to protect indigenous peoples in the enjoyment of
their land and resource tenure. And, of course, those
domestic legal advances already achieved remain far from
fully
implemented
and
translated
into
reality
for indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, these developments
signify a clear trend in the direction of the relevant
international practice, and they constitute legal obligations
for state officials under domestic law and give rise to
expectations of conforming behavior on the part of the
international community.342

In many ways the controversy surrounding DAPL has
highlighted the insufficiencies in the United States domestic
legal framework to protect tribal lands and resources.
Moreover, this framework not only includes domestic legal
advances discussed by Anaya and Williams, such as the
consultation regime enshrined in various federal statues,
executive orders, and regulations, but existing obligations and
rights guaranteed in bilateral treaties with Indian tribes.343
Thus, for Indian treaty rights to be given life and meaning
in United States courts, there must be a continued shift
towards the developing international norms relating to
Indigenous rights, including a reexamination of the domestic
framework relating to ancestral land and resource claims to
340. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American
Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001).
341. See generally Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (2000); 16 U.S.C.
§ 470 Section 101(d)(6)(B)); 36 C.F.R. § 800 (2017); 16 U.S.C. § 470aa–mm; 16
U.S.C. § 1996; 25 U.S.C. § 3001; 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (2017).
342. Anaya & Williams, supra note 340, at 58–59.
343. Id.
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include measures of land restoration and general
reconciliation. While there can be a number of ways
reconciliation-based mechanisms for Native land and resource
concessions could be implemented in the existing United States
system, former U.N. Special Rapporteur James Anaya provided
an outline for such implementation when he posited that,
Measures of reconciliation and redress should include, inter
alia, initiatives to address outstanding claims of treaty
violations or non-consensual takings of traditional lands to
which indigenous peoples retain cultural or economic
attachment, and to restore or secure indigenous peoples’
capacities to maintain connections with places and sites of
cultural or religious significance . . . .344

CONCLUSION
Although the Sioux Tribes’ legal actions in the fight
against the DAPL are still pending, the court has, to date,
denied numerous requests that would have barred construction
and operation of the pipeline pending resolution of the Tribes’
legal claims. The dearth of judicial protections has allowed
construction to occur underneath Lake Oahe in direct
opposition to the Tribes’ requests and in violation of their
treaty rights.
In addressing the Tribes’ treaty rights implicated by
DAPL, the courts have thus far failed to rule that the treaty
rights alone create a legal basis to challenge the actions of the
Army Corps in its approval of the project. This reading of
treaty rights as cabined within judicial doctrine diminishes the
status of treaty rights as law, as explicitly set forth in the
Supremacy Clause.
Under the fundamental understanding of a treaty, the
obligations conferred constitute contractual rights between
sovereign nations that should be honored.345

344. ANAYA, supra note 338, at ¶ 90.
345. See Clinton, supra note 8, at 115. As Clinton asserts:
While some scholars have invoked international law constraints to arrive
at similar conclusions, many Americans too readily dismiss such
exogenous standards in favor of their own constitutional principles. The
purpose of this essay is to invite discussion of whether the basic
American constitutional principles, history, and legal structure of this
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Further, under United States v. Sioux Nation, the only
remedy for violations of these rights is monetary compensation.
Through the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause and the “settling” of Indian claims through the Indian
Claims Commission and Court of Claims, the caselaw has
diminished the only constitutionally recognized claims for
Indians—treaty claims—limiting Tribes’ attempts to protect
their lifeways, their ancestral and treaty-reserved lands and
resources to the existing “consultation” and other procedural
provisions in various federal statutes.346
For Indian tribes whose cultures and sovereignty are
inextricably tied to land ownership, the current constitutional
doctrines create a no-win scenario for treaty tribes in situations
where Congress possesses unilateral power to abrogate treaties
and Indian claims are considered “settled” by the just
compensation regime. Further, the struggle undertaken at
Standing Rock made two things clear: first, human rights
implications are inherent in the difficulties encountered by
tribes to maintain rights to their ancestral homelands and
resources, once expropriated; and second, the lack of a rightsbased framework and attendant remedies under federal law.
The current lack of a rights-based mechanism to ensure
country require the same result. This essay challenges the federal
government and, most notably, the federal judiciary, to honor American
legal traditions by abiding by the nation’s own founding principles with
respect to the nation’s first people. Thus, the essay offers primarily a
historically-derived immanent, rather than an external, critique of
American constitutional law applied to Indian affairs. It challenges the
American legal structure to rethink its colonialist past and to revisit its
concern for democracy, local control, consent, and territorial sovereignty
in application to the nation’s Indian tribes . . . .

Id.
346. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Indian Trust Responsibility:
Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief
Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 360 (2013); Wood explains that:
Unlike historical times, there is now a detailed statutory environmental
scheme to control actions that harm the environment—a scheme that
includes the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act, and more. This federal statutory structure obscures the role
of the trust doctrine in protecting native lands and resources, because
there is a tendency to assume that the multitude of environmental laws
will protect Indian country.
Id.; see also Gabriel S. Galanda, The Federal Indian Consultation Right: A
Frontline Defense Against Tribal Sovereignty Incursion, FED. INDIAN LAW. Fall
2010.
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performance of tribal treaty obligations illustrates the fallacy of
the Supremacy Clause. The situation faced by the Great Sioux
Nation begs reconsideration of the deference tribal treaties are
due under the text of the Constitution.

